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Abstract:
Human rights are a central element in the new governmental project in the 'New South
Africa', and this article traces some of the specific forms of connection and
disconnection between notions of justice found in townships of the Vaal and rights
discourses as articulated by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Human rights
in post-apartheid South Africa have had varied social effects which are understood
through the categories of'adductive affinities' and 'relational discontinuities'. Religious
values and human rights discourse have converged on the notion of'reconciliation' on
the basis of shared value orientations and institutional structures. There are clear
divergences, however, between human rights and notions of justice as expressed in
local lekgotla, or township courts, which emphasized punishment and revenge. The
article concludes that the plurality of legal orders in South Africa results not from
systemic relations between 'law' and 'society'. Instead, pluralism emerges from multiple
forms of social action seeking to alter the direction of social change in the area of
justice, within the context of the nation-building project of the post-apartheid state.
Two Vignettes n' 'Reconciljution' and 'Justice"
Septembei 2 i, t *v>o. Sireei Theatre sponsored by the South African Council of
Churches at the Central Methodist Church during a meeting of the victims'
organization the Khulumani Support Group.
A black minister presents a white Afrikaans-speaking policeman to his
congregation. The policeman confesses to ihe daughter and widow of a dead African
man that he was present at the torturing and murder. The policeman says, 7 'm sorry.
I was afraid. I would like to seek to reconcile with you'. The women react angrily
and the mother shouts 'You are a bastard and you deserve to die.' Jhe minister puts
himself between the two parties and protects the policeman. An old man, a relative
also of the deceased, enters and quotes Genesis. He says that he forgives the
policeman, 'I forgive but I won 7 forget. I want to build a new South Africa.' Ihe
pastor extols his virtue, saying, 'You have set an example for the others'. He sends
the two women to a trauma counselor.
Duma Khumalo was sentenced to death with five others in 1986 for the murder of a
local Vaal councilor, Mr. Dlamini, which he always claimed he never committed1..
The 'Sharpeville Six' became a cause celebre, a case which was taken to the United
Nations and became an international symbol of the lack of justice for blacks under
apartheid. When Duma was released in 1993 after seven years on death row, he
demanded a retrial, but was ignored. He staged a sit-in at Sharpeville police station
for 27 days in November 1995. In December the police took him to meet with the
chief prosecutor and white magistrate in Vereeniging who said that he didn 't have a
legal case to hear, as there was no new evidence. On the 5"1 of January, 1996, Duma
hid an axe in his coat, entered the Vereeniging court while it was in session, and went
berserk. Duma Khumalo is an imposing figure at over 6 feet tall and weighing over
200 pounds. The prosecutor cowered under his desk and shrieked 'Don't kill me!' As
others fled screaming, he swung the axe at desks, chairs, furniture, and the court s PA
system. He attacked no one, and when armed police arrived he put his axe down
calmly and put his hands in the air. In minutes, he had caused pandemonium.
wreaked SI 5000 worth of damage, and hewn a large pile of expensive leak firewood.
When I interviewed him in late 1996, Duma told me, 'I just wanted justice3.'
Legal Pluralism and Human Rights in South Africa
South Africa's first post apartheid government, led by the African National Congress
(ANC), has embarked upon a nation-building project consciously predicated upon the
creation of a 'culture of human rights'. This involved a number of classic liberal
institutional reforms such as the incorporation of international human rights law into
the Bill of Rights of the 1996 Constitution, and the setting up of an array of new
bodies such as the Human Rights Commission and the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC). This article evaluates the manifold consequences of state
formulations of human rights in African 'townships', by looking at local responses to
the view of'reconciliation' commonly espoused during TRC Human Rights Violations
hearings. It attempts to answer questions such as: how does transnational human
rights talk relate to everyday moralities and normative understandings of justice? Do
human rights concepts have any purchase in areas affected by political violence and if
so, then how and why?
Over the past fifteen years, there has been a lively dialogue between anthropologists
and colonial historians regarding the relationship between state law and informal
moralities and mechanisms of adjudication which are sometimes referred to as
'customary law'. A key and contested notion in this debate has been 'legal pluralism';
both a descriptive term and analytical concept which attempts to address the existence
of more than one legal system in a single political unit. In general, anthropologists
have found the term useful, whereas historians of colonialism have objected to it, and
this article asks whether legal pluralism is valuable for thinking about legal
consciousness in the unique historical phase of the dismantling of apartheid, an
institutionalized regime of racial segregation and dominance.
Legal pluralism originated in anti-positivist legal philosophy in the early twentieth
century, as a reaction to an exclusionary state centralism which only regarded state law
as 'law14. In reality, argued pluralists, state law was far from absolute, and in many
contexts was not particularly central in the normative ordering of society. Against
legal monism, Malinowski (1926), asserted that social norms in non-state societies
perform the same regulatory functions as legal norms, thus raising non-codified social
rules to the status of'law'. The insight that law does not have absolute privilege in
dealing with conflict was an important one3, even though it came with normative
functionalist assumptions about organic stability and stasis.
Legal pluralists such Jane Collier (1975) and Sally Engle Merry (1988) reinforced
Malinowski's stance, by conceptualizing legal and social norms as equivalent and
mutually constitutive. Judicial rules and extra-state norms (e.g. found in customary or
'community' courts) are both 'law', on the grounds that both are codes of social
thought expressing moralities and social identities6. The legal and non-legal relate to
each other as competing normative discourses, and there is no inherent categorical
hierarchy between them although it was recognized that the state usually enjoys an
institutionalized dominance over private moralities7.
However, the emphasis on the importance and autonomy of social norms rather than
positivized rules often entailed a neglect of the colonial state in the writings of mid-
century legal anthropologists of Africa such as Schapera (1938). Legal anthropology in
the colonial context often characterized state law and informal law as co-existing, but
unconnected, spheres of authority and adjudication, which employed different
procedures embedded in distinct moralities. Discussions of the relationship between
state and informal law often portrayed the two systems as static and isolated, thus
fuelling parallel debates about universalism and cultural relativism within human rights.
Within Southern African legal anthropology, an isolationist perspective is adopted in
Comaroff and Roberts' (1981) influential book Rules and Processes. This
characterized 'Tswana law' as a forum for individual negotiation separate from the
interventions of colonial and postcolonial legal regimes. Although the authors have
moved on to look in greater depth at the place of'customary law' within colonial policy
(Roberts 1991), others have maintained a view of customary law as fundamentally
controlled at the level of local communities and culture, rather than by colonial and
post-colonial states. Gulbrai1" : for one, argues that the colonial
encounter did noi erode the local political-juridical bodies of the Northern Tswana of
the Bechuanaland Protectorate (now Botswana), which were able to safeguard a
'genuinely Tswana normative repertoire'. The stress in Gulbrandsen's (p. 128) study is
upon the preservation of'cultural integrity' and the 'autonomy of Tswana jurisprudence'
according to culturally specific ideas about gender, hierarchy and space, to the
detriment of a thoroughgoing analysis of the transformation of'customary law' by
successive states.
The anthropological consensus on legal pluralism was directly challenged in the mid
1980s onwards by 'legal centralist' critiques which have argued that collapsing legal
and social norms into the same category mistakenly turns all social norms and values
into 'law'. This move makes defining law problematical since every norm is defined as
'legal'. Legal pluralism, it is argued by legal theorists such as Brian Tamanaha (1993),
loses sight of how the rules of state law are created by specialists within state
institutional structures and backed by a monopoly on means of physical coercion.
Legal rules and social norms are constructed through quite different processes:
positivized, written legal rules are generated by specialists within rationalized
bureaucratic structures. Moreover, Tamanaha correctly points out that legal
anthropologists never formulated a cross-cultural definition of law that did not
somehow rely upon the state8.
The primacy that anthropologists give to Africans' juridical autonomy has been
subjected to a recent critique by colonial historians, who generally take the view that
'customary law' was utterly transformed by, controlled and integrated within the
administrative apparatus of the colonial state9. Instead of legal pluralism in Africa,
there was only' a single, interactive colonial legal system"0. The most influential and
consistent advocate of the centralist approach to African legal history has been Martin
Chanock (1985, 1991) whose work focuses primarily on the place of the legal regime
in the policies of the colonial state. He asserts that legal ideology has been a central
part of the domination of society by the state. In his materialist reading, colonial and
customary law were welded into a single instrument of dispossession and were part of
a wider administrative policy of creating and maintaining a particular type of
peasantry". Rather than being the product of immutable tradition, 'custom' was
manufactured as a legitimating device for maintaining the status quo after
dispossession by reinforcing the position of the chieftancy. Pluralism is but a legal
fiction, a part of the ideology of British 'indirect rule' in African and Indian colonial
territories. According to Chanock (1991 81), 'An indigenous system of land tenure did
not exist under colonial conditions, but its shadow was summoned into existence by
both colonial and postcolonial states, essentially to retard the establishment of freehold
rights for Africans.'
In evaluating this debate, my sympathies are broadly with the legal pluralists, since the
above centralist critiques have not fully taken into account more recent studies which
conceptualize the relationship between state and non-state legalities in increasingly
sophisticated ways. We are not forced to choose between the insights of legal
pluralists or legal centralists, who have been moving closer to each others' positions in
recent years to look at the interplay between state law and local ideas and institutions
of justice.
Because of the way the question is formulated ('What is the relationship between law
and society?'), neither tradition is wholly indispensable. Legal pluralism provides an
important descriptive model of society as made up of a diversity of modes of conflict
resolution, shattering the myth of state law's unchallenged empire12. On the other
hand, the centralist argument has identified a logical contradiction: when the domains
of the legal and non-legal are fused'3, the category of law becomes meaningless, as it
includes everything from table manners to national constitutions and transnational
convenants of rights. Further, centralists remind us of the Weberian maxim that law is
a semi-autonomous discourse created by bureaucratic officials for the purposes of legal
domination. Law's norms are positivized ones, often far removed, though not wholly
unrelated, to the lived norms of existential experience.
It is possible to take a more synthetic view of the creative tension between
anthropologists and colonial historians, and build up a version of legal pluralism that is
useful for thinking about the interactions between state officials advocating new human
rights ideas and practices, and local moralities and legal institutions in African
communities. There has been excellent work by social historians on the interactions
between Africans and European colonial administrators, each pursuing their own
interests, with the result being a 'complex patchwork of overlapping legal
jurisdictions'" The work of Sally Falk Moore (1978, 1986) provides a useful starting
point, as she has maintained a legal pluralist perspective while keeping the state firmly
within the scope of the analysis. In Moore's view, 'customary law' is the product of
historical competition between local African power holders and central colonial rulers,
each trying to maintain and expand their domains of control and regulation. Law is
imposed upon 'semi-autonomous social fields', with uneven and indeterminate
consequences. We must not over-estimate the power of law to exert its will, as the
connection between native courts on Kilimanjaro and the British colonial high court
was 'nominal rather than operational (1986:1 SO).' Moore takes us away from a static
view of plural legal systems to look at the historical transformations of regulatory
practices, and her work oscillates between small scale events (individual court cases)
and large scale social processes (colonialism, decolonization etc.). Moore largely
accepts Chanock's portrayal of the profound transformation of'customary law' by
colonial rule, yet her more interactionist focus upon the Habermasian 'life world', and
more specifically upon the kinship basis of Chagga society, means that she allows more
room for local strategizing towards greater political autonomy. She concludes in one
essay (1991:125) that 'local law cases reflect the local history of African peoples rather
than the history of the Europeans who ruled them.'
Yet there is still some work to do on the notion of legal pluralism in order to replace
the stark dualism of pluralism vs. centralism by a redefinition of the subject matter.
Instead of adopting over-systematizing theories which construct the 'legal' and
'societal' as two total and coherent cultural systems with distinct logics11, we must
analyze how adjudicative contexts are transformed over time by the social actions of
individuals and collectivities, within a wider context of state regulation and discipline.
In any locale, there are a variety of institutions and competing value orientations which
have emerged via a -dig process of piecemeal aggregation, rupture and upheaval, and
continue to be transrornta by social action.
In a revised view of legal pluralism, the question to be answered is how social actors
(including both individuals and collectivities) have contested the direction of social
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the legitimization of new forms of authority. This is a legal pluralism of action,
movement and interaction between legal orders in the context of state hegemonic
projects. In post-apartheid South Africa this involves looking at how state officials,
township courts, and Anglican ministers combine transnational human rights talk,
religious notions of redemption and reconciliation, and popular ideas of punishment
and revenge in an effort to control 'historicity' (i.e., the direction of social change, in
the formulation of Alain Touraine 1971, 1995:219, 368)16. The struggle over
historicity in post-apartheid South Africa presents itself as a struggle over how to deal
with the political crimes of the apartheid past, to construct discontinuitie with the past
and in so doing to reconfigure legal authority in the present. The plurality of legal
orders therefore exist within a context of remarkably rapid movement in the
production of norms and values.
Legal institutions, be they local township for a, magistrates' courts or human rights
commissions, are simultaneously subjected to centralizing and pluralizing discourses
and strategies. At different historical moments, one set of strategies may exercise
dominance over another and become hegemonic. In the mid 1980s, as the internal
anti-apartheid movement led by the United Democratic Front reached its crescendo
and 'popular courts' punitively enforced counter-hegemonic values and political
strategies, the dominant tendencies in the area of justice were fragmenting, decentering
and pluralizing11.
Since the post-apartheid elections of 1994, the main direction of legal change has been
towards greater centralization as state officials attempt to restore the legitimacy of
state legal institutions. Government officials such as the Minister of Justice Dullah'
Omar have sought to integrate certain non-state structures (armed units of the
liberation movements and Inkatha Freedom Party) within the criminal justice system,
and exclude others such as township 'community' courts. Part of my general thesis
about the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission is that it represents an
effort on the part of the new regime to reformulate 'justice' and establish a unified and
uncontesied administrative authority. This is a common strategy of regimes emerging
from authoritarianism, which seek to unify a fragmented legal structure inherited from
the ancien regime. The notion of'reconciliation' found in human rights talk is the
discursive lynchpin in the centralizing project of post-apartheid governance. Human
rights performs a vital hegemonic role in 'democratizing societies' of Africa and Latin
America; one which compels social conformity, guiding the population away from
punitive retribution by characterizing it as illegitimate 'mob justice"8.
The new values of a rights culture are formulated primarily by intellectuals and lawyers
representing a new political elite which have sought to superimpose them upon a
number of semi-autonomous social fields. These values engender new discursive and
institutional sites of struggle and their impact is uneven and emergent, raising questions
for research such as: has the centralizing project as pursued through the TRC altered
the terms of the debate on post-apartheid justice and if so how? How can we more
precisely conceptualize the specific continuities and discontinuities between normative
codes? In what areas of social life are human rights ideas and practices resisted, when
are they appropriated, and when are they simply ignored?
In post-apartheid South Africa there are a heterogeneity of competing discourses and
systems of values around justice and reconciliation. Christian discourses on
forgiveness advocated by Truth and Reconciliation Commission officials often swayed
individuals at hearings, but they also jarred with retributive notions of justice, which
are routinely applied in local township and chiefs' courts. In thinking about how to
understand the complex negotiations around the TRC's redemptive concept of
reconciliation, I eschew categories of'law' and 'society' in order to examine two forms
of connection and disconnection between the TRC and one urban African
constituency.
adductive affinities, where the TRC's understanding of reconciliation as
forgiveness shared close associations with the religious values of victims and local
churches. The positive responses of victims to the idea of national reconciliation can
be understood in terms of both the ritualized aspects of hearings and pre-existing value
associations between human rights and religious discourses.
relational discontinuities: human rights can diverge with local court
formulations of justice, which emphasize revenge and punishment. If'reconciliation' is
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the key category of the new state's centralizing project, then 'revenge' is the main
concept around which pluralizing notions of justice coalesce.
These two categories are not static and mutually exclusive and writers such as Minow
(1998) and Jacoby (1983) have asserted that retribution need not entail vengeance, and
that vengeance and forgiveness can converge19. In the South African instance, these
categories of justice are reformulated with respect to one another by different social
actors. Paying attention to the unintended consequences of moral categories alerts us
to the slippage between 'reconciliation' and 'revenge'. Ironically, the threat of
punishment through local institutions can facilitate the results which human rights
commissions seek, namely co-existence between former pariahs and their neighbors in
the townships.
The Structure of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Along with the Guatemalan 'Historical Clarification' commission, the South African
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1996-1998), or TRC, is the latest in over IS
truth commissions in the world during the last two decades. Truth commissions have
become standard institutions in democratizing countries, each set up to investigate
certain aspects of human rights violations under authoritarian rule20. It is also claimed
that truth commissions can revitalize citizen's respect for the rule of law, and promote
the creation of a new 'culture of human rights'.
In South Africa, the 1994 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act
mandated the TRC to investigate 'gross violations of human rights', defined as 'the
killing, abduction, torture or severe ill treatment of any person' between I" March
1960 (the Sharpeville massacre) and 5th December 199321. The terms of reference
allowed the possibility of including high-ranking intellectual authors of atrocities, as
they referred to 'any attempt, conspiracy, incitement, instigation, command or
procurement to commit an act.' This was the widest mandate of any truth commission
to date, but did not include within its mandate the banality and technicality of apartheid
segregation policies. The terms limited investigations to those who went beyond the
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already wide latitude of abuse permitted by apartheid laws Detentions without trial,
forced removals and 'Bantu' education policy, all legal under apartheid, were not
included under the terms of the Act", although they are seen by many as human rights
violations.
The work of the TRC was divided into three committees: the Human Rights Violations
Committee, the Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee and the Amnesty
Committee.
Throughout 1996 and 1997, the Human Rights Violations Committee held 80 hearings
in town halls, hospitals and churches all around the country, where thousands of
ordinary citizens came and testified about past abuses. This process received wide
national media coverage and brought ordinary, mostly black, experiences of the
apartheid system into the national public space in a powerful way. The South African
TRC took more statements than any previous truth commission in history (over
21000) and the Human Rights Violations Committee faced the daunting task of
checking the veracity of each testimony, choosing which would be retold at public
hearings and passing along verified cases to the Reparations and Rehabilitation
Committee. The TRC also took on a limited investigative role, and by issuing
subpoenas and taking evidence in camera, it constructed a fragmented picture of the
past. In its final report published in October 1998, the TRC produced findings on the
majority of the 21298 cases brought before it, and it named 400 perpetrators of
violations, unlike the Argentine and Chilean commissions. The 'truth' of the South
African truth commission lay in its officially confirming and bringing into the public
space what was already known, rather than discovering hitherto 'hidden truths'.
The efforts of the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee to facilitate 'reconciliation'
represented the weakest of the three committees' activities . Part of the problem lay in
the fact that the TRC had no money of its own to disburse to survivors; instead it
could only make unbinding recommendations to the President's Fund. The TRC made
it abundantly clear that victims should expect little from the process and only a fraction
of what they might have expected had they prosecuted for damages through the courts.
In the end, it recommended that those designated 'victims' should receive
12
approximately US$3500 per year over a six year period. It remains to be seen whether
the reparations process, a key element in 'reconciliation', will even begin to address
the needs and expectations of survivors.
Finally, the South African TRC was unique in bringing the amnesty process within the
truth commission, whereas in other countries it had always been a separate judicial
mechanism. The final deadline for amnesty applications was 10 May 1996 and the
TRC was overwhelmed with over 7000 applications. To receive amnesty, the
applicant had to fulfil a number of legal criteria, including convincing the panel that the
crime was political: i.e., not committed for personal gain, malice or spite. Crucially,
the applicant had to fully disclose all was known about the crime and its political
context, including the chain of command which authored the act. If amnesty was
refused, or if it was later found that the applicant did not fully disclose all material
evidence in their cases, then they could be prosecuted in future.
In amnesty hearings, former members of the security police divulged information never
made public before such as the existence of a covert body called Trewits' which drew
up lists of activists to be 'eliminated' (i.e., killed). Amnesty applicants also confirmed
much of what was suspected, for instance; that in 1989 President P.W. Botha ordered
the bombing of Khotso House, the national office of the South African Council of
Churches. The amnesty hearings were a theatricalization of the power of the new
state, which compelled key actors in the previous political conflict to confess, when
they would rather have maintained their silence. Perpetrators were compelled to speak
the new language of human rights, and in so doing to recognize the new government's
power to admonish and to punish.
This theatricalization of power gives us one clue as to why democratizing governments
set up truth commissions rather than relying upon the existing legal system: truth
commissions are transient politico-religious-legal institutions which have much greater
symbolic potential than dry, rule-bound and technically-obsessive courts of law. The
TRC's legal status was ambiguous: one the one hand, it was not a court of law which
could prosecute nor sentence, but on the other it was administered by the Ministry of
Justice and had powers of subpoena, seizure and could grant legal indemnity from
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prosecution. The South African truth commission inhabited a liminal space between
state institutions and this liminality granted it a certain freedom from both the strictures
of legal discourse and the institutional legacy of apartheid National legal discourse did
not contain within itself the language to undertake its own rehabilitation, so the
liminality of the TRC allowed it to plagiarize from a religious idiom. The TRC's
position as a quasi-judicial institution allowed it to mix genres-of law, politics and
religious- in particularly rich ways and this makes it an interesting case study for
understanding how human rights interact with wider moral and ethical discourses.
Reconciling Races?
The dominant view on 'reconciliation' in the TRC was created through an amalgam of
transnational human rights values and a Christian ethic of forgiveness and redemption.
It was propagated through dozens of Human Rights Violations (HRV) hearings where
selected 'victims' spoke of the violations which themselves or relatives had suffered. In
the HRV hearings, Commissioners would lay a redemptive template across testimonies
as they responded to victims' stories, which conjoined individual suffering and a
narrative of nation-building. Commissioners' responses were formulaic, predictable
and they regularly contained the following stages: a recognition of suffering, the
morally equalizing of suffering, the portrayal of suffering as a necessary sacrifice for
the 'liberation' of the nation, and finally the forsaking of revenge by victims. There
was a progressive movement built into these stages, from concentrating on the
individual testimony, to moving away from the individual towards the collectivity and
the nation, and finally back to the individual, all in order to facilitate forgiveness and
reconciliation.
Recognizing and Collectivizing Suffering
The first stage involved ex^iassing an appreciation of the evidence and sympathy for
the witness. The individual circumstances were given recognition and value by
Commissioners. From the idiosyncratic individual circumstances, Commissioners
quickly moved to the universal aspects of suffering under apartheid. When Peter
Moletsane", recounted how he was tortured in police custody in 1986 after he
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protested against the killing of his uncle, TRC Chairperson Desmond Tutu replied,
'Your pain is our pain. We were tortured, we were harassed, we suffered, we were
oppressed.' Tutu was not actually claiming that he had been actually tortured like
Moletsane. Instead, Tutu was constructing a new political identity, that of a 'national
victim', a new South African self which included all the dimensions of suffering and
oppression. Thus, individual suffering, which ultimately is always unique, was brought
into a public space where it could be collectivized and shared by all, and merged into a
wider narrative of national redemption. At ritualized HRV hearings, suffering was
lifted out of the mundane world of individuals and their profane everyday pain, and
was made sacred in order to construct a new national collective conscience24.
The Moral Equalizing of Suffering
In the HRV hearings, commissioners repeatedly asserted that all pain was equal,
regardless of class or racial categorization or religious or political affiliation. Whites,
blacks. ANC comrades and Inkatha Freedom Party members and others all felt the
same pain. No moral distinction was drawn on the basis of what actions a person was
engaged in at the time. Whether they were informing to the police or placing
explosives for the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA): the fact that they
suffered was enough.
For instance Susan van der Merwe, told of how her husband, a white Afrikaner fanner,
had been killed by MK (the armed wing of the ANC) guerrillas whom he picked up
hitchhiking along the border with Botswana. His vehicle was found but his body
remained missing, hidden somewhere in the scrub brush of the desert. Archbishop Tutu
responded to the story by saying:
I hope that you feel that people in the audience sympathize with you. Our first
witness this morning (an African man, Gardiner Majova, whose son had
disappeared in 1985) also spoke of getting the remains of a body back. It is
wonderful for the country to experience that-black or white-we all feel the same
pain.
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This moral equalizing is a common strategy adopted by reconciling post-war regimes
to avoid public identification with one side in the conflict. Eric Santner (1992:144)
writes how in Bitburg, Germany in 1985 at a public ceremony of reconciliation, there
was a 'sentimental equalization of all victims of war,' which he understands as part of a
wider rehabilitation of the SS within a narrative of'Western' resistance to Bolshevism.
Public rituals such as the TRC hearings in South Africa and the Bitburg memorial
service in Germany are complex mnemonic readjustments designed to defuse political
discord by denying the ideological reasons which called the conflict in the first place".
Liberation and Sacrifice
The embedding of an individual's account into an allegory of liberation began straight
after the testimony. The first question by a commissioner leading the cross-examining
was almost always about the context of the township or area at the particular time, not
the individual event or unique circumstances of the victim. In this way, individual
events were sutured to a social context of chaos, resistance, rioting against police, rent
and school boycotts and therefore part of a wider liberation struggle. 'Sacrifice'
provided the main symbolism to graft individual pain onto wider political narratives
and social processes and this provided new meaning for death by creating a heroic
figure of self-sacrifice in a new mythology of the state. Meaning was attached to the
death by a process of teleologizing-of mapping onto the experiences of the dead and
the survivors a narrative of destiny which portrays an inexorable progression towards
liberation and the place of the specific individuals within it. This teleologizing of
senseless loss and pain is a common feature of'survivor's syndrome', and has been
documented for the Holocaust (Bettelheim 1952) and Argentina (Suarez-Orozco
1991).
The message was that people died not in vain but for the liberation of the nation.
Commissioners often referred to victims at hearings as 'heroes'. The history of the
new South Africa is a iiisivry of suffering which was necessary for its liberation and
redemption. A clear link »as forged between religious interpretations of suffering
emphasizing sacrifice and martyrs, and a more secular liberation narrative, with its
imagery of national heroes. A unifying symbol which brought these two narratives
together in a particularly powerful way was the figure of the Black Consciousness
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leader Steve Biko. It emerged in the testimony of a security policeman applying for
amnesty that Biko had been chained to a gate in the crucifix position before he died'6,
symbolizing him as a Black Christ of the oppressed African nation.
Benedict Anderson (1991) has drawn our attention to how nations are imagined
through their war dead, focussing upon cenotaphs and tombs of the unknown soldier,
which are filled with the ghostly imaginings of the nation. On certain memorial days,
the whole nation participates in a simultaneous event to memorialize their dead.
Similarly, HRV hearings often ended with the chair asking the audience to stand and
observe one minute's silence for the new nation's fallen heroes. This has been
institutionalized in South Africa with a Day of Reconciliation each December 16th"
ironically also the day in which the ANC celebrates the instigation of the armed
struggle in 1961, and Afrikaner nationalists celebrate the 'Day of the Covenant' in
memory of the white settler's defeat of 12000 Zulu warriors at the 'Battle of Blood
River' in 1838. This is the day on which the TRC started its work in 1995
Redemption through Forsaking Revenge
I believe that we all have the capacity to become saints.
TRC Chairperson Desmond Tutu27
In this final stage, the spiritual recompense for the loss of a family member was
accentuated in the hope that it would preclude any need for individual acts of
retaliation. The experience of the TRC would 'heal wounds' and smooth over
resentments. Once individual suffering was valorized and linked to a national process
of liberation, then Commissioners urged those testifying to forgive perpetrators and
abandon any desire for retaliation against them. Commissioners never missed an
opportunity to praise witnesses who did not express any desire for revenge. When
Desmond Tutu replied to two cases of murder where the body was not found, he gave
out clear signals about his views on retaliation. In the case of Susan van der Merwe28
who had lived in relative penury after her husband's disappearance, Tutu said:
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It is good to see that you are not bearing any grudges. You state that your story
of pain is but a drop in the ocean, but it is still pain that happened to you. I hope
that God will anoint your wounds with the Holy Spirit and heal them.
The hearings were structured in such a way that any expression of a desire for revenge
would seem out of place. Virtues of forgiveness and reconciliation were so loudly and
roundly applauded that emotions of revenge, hatred and bitterness were rendered
unacceptable, an ugly intrusion on a peaceful, healing process.
What were the responses to the TRC's narrative on reconciliation in the townships of
South Africa: that is, how did local actors respond to the transnational human rights
discourse when it was introduced to their communities via the TRC? My ten months'
research focussed on the Vaal Triangle to the south of Johannesburg, an industrialized
and urban region of approximately two million people. It is an area with a long and
intense history of political violence; from the Sharpeville massacre in 1960 to the
necklacing of black councilors in 1984, to the undeclared war between the ANC and
the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in the 1990s This conflict led to a number of
massacres in 1991-2, which temporarily derailed the peace talks between Mandela and
De Klerk. Politically motivated massacres continued into late 1993, just months before
the non-racial elections.
My analysis of this research identifies no single definable relationship between human
rights and 'society', instead the language of rights has had uneven and varied social
effects Religious values and human rights discourse converged on the notion of
reconciliation on the basis of shared value orientations. There was a clear divergence
however between human rights and popular notions of justice as expressed in a local
township court.
Adductive Affinities Between Relieion and Rights
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This category draws its inspiration from Weber's notion of'elective affinities' which
drew attention to the reciprocal effects resulting from a resonance or coherence
between frameworks of values in different social fields. In post 1994 South Africa
there has been a discernible correspondence between the state's nation-building
discourse on reconciliation and the social doctrine of large sections of the 'progressive'
' -
;
 -.-vie and Protestant churches. This section of the religious community has been a
icii'iiainhead of symbolism for the TRC's own conceptualization of reconciliation. It
also provided the main societal infrastructure for the TRC.
The collective effervescence of ritualized hearings became the mechanism through
which the TRC's idealization of reconciliation was transmitted to participants. TRC
hearings positioned individuals and their private narratives within a public narrative
structure which made them aware of themselves as particular types of subjects. The
creation of new identities ('victim', 'perpetrator') engendered new types of attitudes
and dispositions (forgiveness, repentance), which bound the subjects to the TRC's own
reconciliation project. This process drew upon a context of existing value-dispositions
or affinities, and new values were forged in the ritual hearings themselves. The
important thing here was the ability of the ritual process to create loyalties and
identities which had not existed before.
The TRC's organizational structure was intertwined with a number of societal
institutions, but none like the church sector. The use of the same networks of
personnel by both institutions led to an overlapping of structures and the transmission
of national narratives on reconciliation to individual victims. The TRC relied on the
churches rather than conflict resolution NGOs or any new mediating structures, as it
saw them as the authentic representatives of the 'community' and 'civil society'.
Due to the overlapping of TRC and religious personnel in the process of statement
taking, religious values were conveyed to victims even before the hearings. The
majority of statements taken in the Vaal were written down by religious activists in
church settings. Statement takers were the first point of contact between the
commission and victims. During interviews with statement takers, the TRC's message
on reconciliation was woven into their written testimonies as the oral testimony of the
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victim was rendered as text. This pre-structuring of the discourse in testimonies even
before the public hearings commenced was a vital part of the shift away from
retribution and towards a view of justice as emanating from 'truth' and 'reparations'.
Two of the Vaal's most active statement takers were church stalwarts. One of them,
Thabiso Mohasoa of Sebokeng's Zone 7 is an International Pentecostal Church
activist. Perhaps strangely for a person writing down oral histories of political violence,
he explained that 'Reconciliation means to forget what happened.' When asked how
he responded to victims' feelings of revenge during statement writing, Mohasoa
described how he steered a victim's perspective in order to, in his words, 'uplift
reconciliation':
I had understood those feelings before...I understood retaliation. People don't
don't know any better. Life in South Africa means fighting one another and
retaliating. If he does it to me, I will do it to him and to his grandchild and then I
will be satisfied... when taking a statement, people would be aggressive, saying "I
want these perpetrators to be hanged." But the TRC will be a failure if people
send negative ideas to it.
Beyond the overlapping networks of TRC statement takers and church activists, there
was an institutional fusion of churches and TRC structures in the Vaal. The TRC
relied heavily on a religious infrastructure to carry out important functions such as
statement taking, arranging hearings and reconciling conflicts of the past. Religious
groups were the only local organizations in the Vaal explicitly working with the TRC
towards the goal of'reconciliation'. Before the HRV hearings in Sebokeng in August
1996, a group of churches led by local Catholic priests led a prayer service in
Sebokeng's notoriously violent Zone 7 to encourage victims to testify. Local township
clergy helped the TRC to identify victims, their members took the vast bulk of the
statements and they advised in the selection of cases to come to public hearings.
In addition to direct organizational links, the work of the Commission was indirectly
reinforced by the conflict resolving agendas of local ministers. A key actor in the Vaal
was a red-haired, ruddy complexioned, fluent SeSotho-speaking Irish priest called
Father Patrick Noonan. The priest activist had run Nyolohelo Catholic Church in Zone
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12 of Sebokeng for 25 years. He had radical political sympathies and was known
affectionately by local ANC youth as 'Comrade Patrick'. Father Noonan was a
political firebrand in the 1980s when the Vaal was made ungovernable by rent and
school boycotts, barricades on street corners, and necklacings of alleged 'apartheid
collaborators'. Now his mission is to pursue reconciliation through forgiveness:
The truth commission is like a national confession. There is an injection of
morality and ethics and that is good...The majority of victims have never gone to
counseling, but those that do go mostly through the parishes That was my
program of renewal.
Father Noonan has had a significant impact on the individual members of his
congregation. One, Cecilia Ncube, has had to cope with the murder of her husband
David killed at the Sebokeng Night Vigil massacre on 11-12 January 1991. David and
Cecilia had been attending the night vigil of their nephew Christopher Nangalembe at
11427, Zone 7, Sebokeng. Christopher, a member of the ANC Youth League and a
Peace Committee monitor, had been killed by a petty criminal Victor Khetisi Kheswa
whom he had brought before a court run by the comrades. Cecilia left Christopher's
night vigil at 10pm on Friday the 11th and went back to her house across the street.
She was awakened at 1AM when members of Kheswa's gang (Kheswa was in hospital
with a gunshot wound in the stomach) attacked the gathering of mourners with hand
grenades and AK-47s: 'I heard shooting and big explosions, like a bomb or hand
grenade and then sirens.' Press reports at the time placed the death toll at between 36
and 42 people, and the number of wounded at least at one hundred29
Instead of being consumed by a desire for revenge, Mrs. Ncube now embraces the new
ethos of reconciliation in the country and credits Father Patrick Noonan for guiding
her:
He is the man who gave me the strength to forgive these people. They didn't
know what they were doing. That is how I survived. I just forgave and moved
on. I was on a local renewal committee and I had to be strong. From Father
Patrick I learned that I couldn't bear a grudge and just had to forgive.
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Cecilia Ncube distanced herself from the other relatives of those killed at Night Vigil
Massacre who combined to form the organization 'Vaal Victims of Violence', the
leader of which is a member of an African nationalist political party which opposed the
TRC's amnesty provisions in the Constitutional Court Cecilia commented on the
unveiling of the memorial with the 36 names of those killed, 'the other victims were
still sick. They were aggressive and violent and calling for revenge. I am a teacher
and understand better. They are just ordinary people.'
In addition to their role in promulgating the values of reconciliation as forgiveness and
their symbolic duties, ministers continue to play an important role in mediating in
ongoing armed conflicts arising from decades of apartheid10. Reverend Peter 'Gift'
Moerane of Sharpeville has urged militarized youth of both the ANC and IFP to
negotiate an end to their cycle of violent revenge killings. He is perhaps the only non-
political party leader with any real authority among ANC 'comrades' in Sharpeville.
Similarly, Father Noonan has used his credibility with armed militants to try to end the
cycle of revenge killings begun in the anti-apartheid years.
From the above instances in the Vaal and elsewhere, we get a picture of the TRC as
having close affinities to religious institutions; sharing personnel and organizational
structures, values of forgiveness and reconciliation and ritual symbolism. This close
association between human rights and religious doctrine remains on of the best
explanations for why the TRC could convert many to its cause of reconciliation. As
Chanock (1985:79-84) has demonstrated, this involvement in legal consciousness on
the part of Christian missionaries is nothing new. During the colonial period,
missionaries sought to shape African attitudes to legal transgression by introducing
ideas about individual and humanist rights, and Christian guilt and sin. Nevertheless,
local actors also pursued other notions of justice which were less shaped by Christian
values, throwing into relief the limitations of religion in resolving political conflicts.
Revenge and Retribution in a Local Court
Juxtaposed to religious affinities to human rights were strong discontinuities which
were articulated primarily through local courts. I term these disjunctives 'relational
discontinuities' in order to distinguish them from early legal pluralist accounts of
customary law and to draw attention to the mutual influences between local, national
and transnational formulations of justice.
Discontinuities in legal consciousness were expressed during and in the aftermath of
the Human Rights Violations hearings held in the Vaal in August 1996. A large section
of the week-long hearings held at the Sebokeng teacher training college dealt with the
atrocities committed by Inkatha Freedom Party agents based at Kwamadala hostel at
the Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR) plant. The most widely known case at the
hearing involved the mothers of two murdered youths who had engaged in a factional
dispute which led to the death of over SO in the 1991 Sebokeng 'Night Vigil Massacre'
and subsequent retaliatory acts.
The TRC hearing was the first time that Ms Margaret Nangalembe, mother of
Christopher and Anna Kheswa, the mother of Christopher's killer Victor Kheswa had
met since their sons' feuding had begun 5 years earlier. They both gave their differing
accounts of events, and at the urging of Commissioners, shook hands publicly in an act
of seeming 'reconciliation'. Ms. Kheswa stated her strong desire to leave the poverty
of Kwamadala hostel and return to her old house in Zone 7 of Sebokeng township,
across the road from the Nangalembe household. The Nangalembe family expressed
no opposition and said that Anna Kheswa need fear no hostility from them. At the
time, former Archbishop Desmond Tutu and other Commissioners extolled this case in
the media as the apogee of reconciliation within the TRC process.
Yet the ritual enactment of reconciliation, the shaking of hands between the mothers of
militarized youth has had little purchase in terms of advancing any 'reconciliation' at
the local level. No IFP members from Kwamadala have successfully returned to any of
the Vaal townships from whence they fled in the 1990-1 period. To the contrary,
some IFP members such as Dennis Moerane of Sharpeville" have been summarily
executed by armed ANC 'Special Defense Units' when they have tried to return to
their former homes in the townships. This resulted in part from the lack of any dispute
resolution mechanisms within the TRC framework to negotiate a lasting local peace
and the return of former 'pariahs' of the community. In many townships, the TRC
represented little more than a symbolic and performative ritual with little organization
on the ground to actually implement its version of reconciliation.
Moreover, there were few initiatives within the TRC to engage with the bodies who
actually exercise political authority in the townships-local justice institutions, armed
vigilante groups and local political party branches, which were seen as too
compromised by their previous role in the violence. Commissioners I interviewed were
hostile to the rough justice of local courts, demonizing them as 'kangaroo courts' which
were antithetical to human rights. This is ironical since some Commissioners linked to
the United Democratic Front actually promoted 'community courts' in the 1980s as
prefigurative organizations of revolutionary people's power. In the new culture of
human rights, armed units of the anti-apartheid movement must be either incorporated
within policing and military structures or isolated and left to wither away.
' In return, there was a profound disdain towards the TRC on the part of local political
actors. The ANC representative to the 1991-2 Peace Committees in Sebokeng, Watch
Mothebedi, scorned the Nangalembe-Kheswa reconciliation, stating
Those two are only individuals. Their reconciliation has no further weight. Ms.
Nangalembe cannot forgive on behalf of the community. She cannot.allow Ms.
Kheswa's return. This must be done by legitimate community institutions, not by
the TRC who come in for one week and then say they've sorted everything out.
i
If the TRC's policy on reconciliation was not entirely legitimate and effective in some
black townships, then how do former 'enemies of the community' negotiate their
return? Who absolves them and negotiates on behalf of the 'community? What does
this tell us about the relationship between transnational human rights, state law and
local justice?
i
In the township of Boipatong, there was the kind of overarching {'legitimate
community institution' to which Mr. Mothebedi referred-a local court- which did seem
t o ' : , ability to protect former apartheid councilors and enforce a more lasting
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peace than in surrounding townships. The small township of Boipatong (population
about 41000) is located across the highway from the massive, Dickensian 1SCOR iron
and steel works, and wedged between several packing and canning factories. This
urban social space contains a heterogeneous linguistic mixture, including speakers of
SeSotho, Pedi, Shangaan, Zulu, SeTswana and a class mixture of wealthy
professionals, industrial laborers, domestic workers and large number of unemployed
It holds a special place in the history of violence in South Africa, as the peace talks
between Nelson Mandela and FW de Klerk were broken off in June 1992 after armed
Inkatha members, allegedly with police accompaniment, streamed across from
KwaMadala hostel and slaughtered over 40 residents of the squatter settlement of
Slovo Park, in Boipatong32.
Residents of Boipatong mediate and adjudicate many disputes with little reference to
the national legal system or bodies such as the TRC, which was seen by local people I
interviewed as weak, ineffectual and as a 'sell-out'. The low level of reparations and
the granting of amnesties to perpetrators strengthened the view that human rights
violated local understandings of 'justice'. Instead of appealing to human rights
commissions to solve problems of social order, local adjudication occurs through a
daily kgotla, SeSotho for 'meeting' or 'court' [plural lekgolla"]. This local forum
mainly deals with petty crimes and domestic disputes, and its presence also has
implications for the legacy of political violence. In particular, it has protected black
councilors who participated in the apartheid local government structure-the Transvaal
Provincial Administration between 1988-1990. In 1984 during the 'Vaal Uprising'
three councilors had been burnt alive by militant crowds and Esau Mahlatsi, the mayor
of Lekoa Council, was murdered in 1993. Boipatong is now unique among Vaal
townships in that apartheid era councilors can live free of intimidation.
The neighborhood court has a strong patriarchal character. The permanent members
of the court are all male and fall into two groups; those over 45, many of whom were
former convicted tsotsis or 'gangsters' and younger men between 20 and 30, most of
whom were combatants in the armed wing of the ANC, umKhonto we Sizwe (MK).
This present kgotla composition is a fusion of two models of township justice-the
patrimonial and gerontocratic courts of the 1970s and the 'popular' revolutionary
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courts of the 1980s, and therefore a combination of two groups who were often
violent political adversaries during the height of the liberation struggle in the mid
1980s. The religious dimension is not absent, as the court contains a preponderance of
members of the Zionist Christian Church (ZCC), a form of African Christianity which
has its main bases in rural areas but also appeals to the urban poor. The court hears
many family disputes (Tuesdays and Thursdays are 'Ladies Days'), cases of petty theft,
assault, inheritance and unpaid debts. It rarely deals with rape cases, and never hears
murder cases.
The kgotla draws its legitimacy by claiming to be an expression of traditional authority
and customary law. Its participants assert that it is 'tribal law' and thus assert a
discontinuity in relation to the criminal courts and international human rights. Unlike
the white magistrates' courts the sentencing of the kgotla avoids incarceration if at all
possible. It is said that everyone can speak out fully, and anyone can cross-examine the
plaintiffs, and sentencing is made by the 'consensus' of the meeting. Court members
claim that unlike human rights commissions, cross-examination from members of the
same community always finds out the guilty, and achieves justice through punishment,
rather than 'reconciliation' and amnesty. Thus a discontinuity with national and
international legal structures is created by local social actors through notions of
'community' and 'tribe'. This is an image of the township dwellers' own alterity as
traditional rural, tribal, pre-modem peoples. However, few residents have been on a
rural African farm34 and most live the thoroughly urbanized existence of an industrial
community.
Instead of being some vestige of the traditional African past, the notion of tribe and
tribal law are part of a more recent political narrative on 'community' and an assertion
of autonomous governance vis-a-vis the state". This points to discontinuities between
the two legal fora, which are relational^ and historically constituted. The pre-1994
legal system was a key institution in authoritarian governance, and opposition to state
policing in townships is still shaped by this history. Before 1994, police and
magistrates' courts were keen enforcers of an institutionalized bureaucratic framework
of racial discrimination. Police were concerned less with controlling common crime
than they were with liquor and pass control raids, and suppressing dissident political
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activity. The judiciary largely upheld apartheid legislation and relegated blacks to an
inferior and dependent position within a dual legal system3'.
There are procedural differences between magistrates and township courts which bear
mentioning: those found guilty by the kgotla are subjected to both restorative justice,
which usually takes the form of monetary payments or free labor and a more punitive
justice, which frequently involves a publicly beating with whips, sjamboks, and golf
clubs. These beatings can be quite severe and the punished often require hospital
treatment. The convicted usually consent to a public flogging in their own township
rather than face being handed over to the van der Bijl Park police and face possible
beatings, torture and a jail sentence. The prevalence of revenge in township courts
draws our attention away from transient human rights invocations of reconciliation,
and demands a greater focus upon 'justice' as a category which is more important in
framing the context of social action.
The place of suffering in the application of justice highlights the differences and
similarities between community justice, criminal law and human rights. The TRC called
for victims to shun vengeful desires to make the perpetrators suffer. In the place of
revenge, victims' would be recompensed by having their stories integrated into a
nation-building narrative and through reparations from the state, rather than from the
offender. Within the TRC process, only the victims' suffering is brought into the public
space. In contrast, public (albeit a different 'public') suffering by the offender is at the
heart of justice in local courts. As with the lex lalionis of the Old Testament, an
equivalent and physical exaction of pain compensated for prior suffering. The
reciprocal infliction of pain which is witnessed by the victim forms the basis of local
court opposition to human rights.
The importance granted to suffering as a form of redress in magistrates' court decisions
resonates with local courts'judgments. Sentencing in common law recognizes
retribution but seeks to subdue the 'collective will', and rationalize inchoate passions of
hatred and vengeance37. Due to their shared valuing of revenge, there are a number of
connections between local courts and the police. The Boipatong township court was
officially recognized by the local magistrate and police station, and the court sends
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certain types of cases it cannot resolve (eg murder and rape) to the formal criminal
justice system. It assists the police in apprehending suspects, and hands over those
who will not consent to beatings. This cooperation between systems has increased
since the formation of the new South African Police Service, but it is not altoegther
unprecedented. During the apartheid years, the state at various historical junctures
enhanced the integration of a dual system of justice, and at various historical moments
promoted the setting up of customary courts in rural areas and local courts in the
townships58.
Yet there are also disjunctives between informal and formal law-the retribution of state
law is of a different sort to popular justice: it involves not the blood, sweat and
screams of the spectacle of public flogging, but a more a silent administrative
incarceration behind the doors of police stations and prisons. Suffering is still the basis
of justice, but it is a slow, hidden suffering which victims can not witness. In
assuming the right to punish, the state deprives the victims of their role in inflicting
suffering upon offenders.
These historically produced relationships take on new meanings in the post-apartheid
period as the urban tribal court in Boipatong has dealt relatively successfully with the
political violence of the past. It is no coincidence that two former National Party
members and councilors from 1988-90 have remained in their homes in the township,
whereas such 'apartheid collaborators' have been killed or chased away from their
homes in all other townships of the Vaal. During interviews, former councilors
reported that since 1994, they are no longer verbally or physically assaulted and feel
protected by the neighborhood court, which they say is prepared to act punitively
against anyone who threatens them. This contrasts strongly with the situation in
neighboring townships without local courts such as Sharpeville, where no councilors
have returned to their former homes, but are 'banished' to shantytowns or special
barbed wire enclosed camps constructed by the police. The existence of an
overarching justice institution in Boipatong has created an environment less conducive
to revenge killings.
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The unintended consequences of'popular justice' are worth remarking upon here.
Despite the opposition in Boipatong to the TRC, the local court realizes many of the
objectives of human rights institutions around conflict mediation. 1 hesitate to use the
word 'reconciliation' since no one in Boipatong thought that it accurately described
the process of co-existence with former 'apartheid collaborators.' Yet it is ironic that a
neighborhood court which portrays itself as a punitive 'tribal' authority and which
rejects the TRC's humanitarian view of human rights for a more retributive view of
justice in the end facilitates the kinds of solutions extolled by the TRC. It does so not
through notions of reconciliation and restorative justice derived from Christian ethics
and human rights talk, but through expressions of traditionalist male authority and the
likelihood of physical sanction against any who flout its decisions39.
Conclusions
Until the early 1960s, 'Legal Pluralism I' held sway in the field of legal anthropology.
It proposed an equivalence and continuum between all types of legal rules and social
norms, and operated with a static and isolationist view of customary law which too
readily assumed the existence of different systems. Over time, it moved from codifying
customary rules to advocating a processual approach which portrayed local law as
characterized by open and seemingly limitless individual negotiation and choice-
making. Legal Pluralism I has been the dominant intellectual paradigm in decades of
writings on 'the Tswana', in what is now South Africa and Botswana. From Schapera
(1938) in the early part of the century, to Comaroff and Roberts (1981) to more recent
writers such as Gulbrandsen (1996), studies of legal practices and discourses among
Setswana-speaking peoples largely accepted the dualistic colonial and apartheid legal
system at face value and ignored how state law transformed local adjudicative
institutions. This paradigm may have resulted from the actual historical experiences of
Setswana-speaking peoples, but is in my view more likely to have been the result of an
entrenched analytical frame which reproduced assumptions of isolation and autonomy.
Certainly those people forcibly categorized as 'Tswana' in the former South African
'homeland' of Bophuthatswana, run by the corrupt Lucas Mangope, had an intimate
knowledge and experience of legal coercion from a violent state.
'Legal Pluralism II' emerged in the early 1970s from within 'critical legal studies' and
the cross-disciplinary 'law-and-society' movement. The emphasis in studies of legal
pluralism soon became the dialectical relationship between state institutions and local
normative orders and the relations of dominance and resistance between them.
Marxist legal anthropologists such as Snyder (1981) argued rightly that the processual
approach treated dispute processes as too self-contained and thus tended to ignore the
wider political context. Local moralities and norms were in a subordinate but resistant
relationship to state law, demanding recognition on their own terms40. Studies in this
tradition then began to look at the politics of judicial processes, drawing from
Gramscian notions of hegemony which where law is an ideology which expresses and
maintains structures of inequality. Foucauldian readings also took hold, seeing law as
a disciplinary apparatus and a site of struggle and contestation between dominant and
resistant discourses of power".
Legal Pluralism II is adequate in many ways for understanding the uniquely polarized
history of apartheid legality. It is particularly well-suited to analyzing the dualistic
legal system administered by a white-run political and legal bureaucracy and resisted by
local political actors who carved out a sphere of'popular justice' in the 1980s. Yet
Legal Pluralism II, with its narrative of dominance and resistance is predisposed to
ignore the real connections between local and state law, and the ways in which
especially elite Africans (in chiefs courts and 'Bantustan' bureaucracies) have
participated in, and acquiesced to, state policies. Relations between formal and
informal justice institutions in the initial post apartheid context are even more volatile
and contradictory than before, and they present a socio-legal environment that prior
formulations of legal pluralism or centralism cannot fully encompass.
A revised legal pluralism would have to preserve from Legal Pluralism II the idea that
many states engage in centralizing efforts to resolve their hegemonic crises, but it
could not accept that there is always an inherent asymmetry between centralizing and
pluralizing processes. Instead of the stark polarity of dominance and resistance which
reduces the complexities of a historically produced political-legal context, we must
turn our attention to shifting patterns of dominance, resistance and acquiescence,
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which occur simultaneously. As we have seen in the Vaal townships, local courts are
both connecting up with policing structures and bypassing them in order to exercise a
certain degree of autonomy to judge and punish. Religious moralities and institutions,
on the other hand, encourage a more favorable disposition towards human rights
values. The notions of elective affinities and relational discontinuities take us away
from generalizations about 'law' and 'society' and offer more concrete ways of
theorizing the uneven reception of human rights in a locale.
In this multivalent context, the degree of plurality of legal fields is often a matter of the
strategic perspectives of social actors. The legal system may appear quite pluralistic
from the Olympian vantage of the Justice Ministry, which surveys hundreds of
unregulated armed units and local courts across the country, each dispensing different
version of'justice' over which it has only a tentative control. However, from the
perspective of a petty criminal apprehended by Boipatong kgotla members and handed
over to the police in van der Bijl Park, the institutions of justice look relatively unified
and integrated.
There are multiple connections between state institutions, religious organizations and
local courts, to the extent that we see a splintering of the unified fields of'state' and
society', and an eradicating of their hard boundaries. Diverse social fields in African
countries are too complex and emergent to be constrained by any explanation which
sees 'law' and 'society' as a priori structural categories to be understood by a single
explanatory framework. Instead of two coherent unified systems which are locked in a
structurally determined struggle, we see combinations of actors and collective groups
who are involved in the production of norms and who create new historical
experiences and experiences of history. The direction of social change in post-
apartheid South Africa, what Touraine refers to as 'historicity', is the product of the
social action of individuals and collective actors (political parties, local courts,
religious organizations etc.) engaged in the reflexive self-production of'society'42.
Just as 'civil society' implies too much common purpose among non-state actors
towards state versions of human rights, neither is the 'state' itself unified and coherent
in its policies. The diversity in human rights practices within the South African state
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can be well demonstrated by juxtaposing the activities of different arms of the state in
the Vaal in 199S-6. Only months before the TRC was taking statements from victims,
arranging its one week hearing in the Vaal townships and carrying out public education
on human rights in the area, policemen in the Murder and Robbery Unit at the nearby
van der Bijl Park police station were routinely torturing criminal suspects using
methods honed during years of defending successive National Party regimes (1948-
1994). Due to successive litigation from human rights lawyers0, four Vaal policemen
were suspended in late 1995 for torturing thirty prisoners. The presiding judge struck
down the prisoners' confessions exacted through torture, and recommended an internal
police investigation. When I re-interviewed a staff member at the Vaal Legal Aid
Centre in 1998 and asked if the situation had improved, he replied, 'Yes. Prisoners
awaiting trial are no longer being tortured. They are only being assaulted.'
The post-apartheid South African regime is in an agonizing process of state
i
reformation; its ANC ministers are unifying, consolidating infrastructure, and
desperately trying to transform institutions such as the police, prisons and magistrates'
courts tainted by their involvement in administering apartheid. Such a hegemonic crisis
is not unique to South Africa. Jean Francois Bayart (1993:249) understood the
tentative and emergent hegemonizing projects of post-colonial African states when he
wrote;
In order to understand "governmentality" in Africa we need to Understand the
concrete procedures by which social actors simultaneously borrow from a range
of discursive genres, intermix them and, as a result, are able to invent original
cultures of the State.
Human rights are a central discursive genre within governmentality in the 'New South
Africa', and this article has traced some of the procedures through which state officials
combine human rights with religious notions of redemption and forgiveness and how
these formulations either resonate with local perspectives (adductive affinities) or are
repulsed (relational discontinuities). The procedures work in different directions
simultaneously, both reinforcing and obstructing the introduction of human rights
values into a context of semi-autonomous legal and moral fields. If revised, then legal <
pluralism remains one useful category which allows us move beyond stark formulations
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of'state' and society', to chart the concrete consequences of social action which contest
historicity in the area of'justice' and 'reconciliation'.
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